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Foundations: Dogville to Manderlay
may their souls rest easy now that lynching is frowned upon 
and we've moved on to the electric chair
Ani di Franco, Fuel
Demiurgic troubles
In Plato’s Timaeus, the Demiurge is referred to as he who has initially ‘fashioned and 
shaped’ the world. In doing so, the Demiurge is guided by the most benign intentions: 
he wants to build a world that is as good as possible. But, in spite of those best aims, 
the world remains imperfect because of the intrinsic flaws of brute matter (hyle). In the 
idealist philosophical view, the myth of the Demiurge is taken to stage the unsettled ten-
sion between immaterial ideas – deemed to be metaphysical and superior – and matter 
– deemed to be limited and inferior: the tension between models to imitate and the prac-
tical application of thosemodels to reality. In the 19th and 20th century, such myth finds 
its translation into Simmel’s ‘conflict of modern culture’: it is the conflict between life and 
forms, or, in current sociological terminology, between agency and structure. All the way 
through, the underlying question remains the same: can humans shape their own world 
as if they were Demiurges? Which humans can? What are the limitations intrinsic to the 
brute matter of the social? 
Traditionally, philosophical anthropology used to provide one of the fora for this discus-
sion. But, even in the ‘secularized’ social sciences, the question – officially rejected as 
irrelevant – is far from resolved and is ultimately  always lurking. True as it may be that 
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social life is made possible by shared language, concepts, stabilized expectations, 
norms, regulations, and so on, the fundamental problem is that all these forms must be 
projected onto, and applied to, what could be characterised as a basically muddy mate-
rial, an intrinsically unstable and at times even reluctant ground. And of course the prob-
lem is inherently both moral and technical: on the one hand, what is the origin of social 
evils? On the other hand, what are the most suitable tools of social engineering and 
what are the limits of any engineer-like attempt to shape the social? Finally, it may also 
be difficult to tell the technical from the moral: is a good regulation a more effective one 
or one which is based on good principles?
Lars von Trier’s Dogville and Manderlay – the first two parts of his up-to-date incomplete 
American trilogy – can be interpreted within a Demiurgic frame. In the following, we re-
gard these two works of art as two sociological experiments. More precisely, we exam-
ine the films as expressing an albeit implicit thesis on the foundations of social order. 
Both experiments are consciously  and deliberately  carried out by Grace, the main char-
acter of the trilogy, in the community where she settles as a foreigner. Heart and reason, 
moral imperatives and technical social-engineering skills, are equally  deployed in the 
course of the experiment. In Grace’s view, or at least in Grace’s intentions, both love 
and law must always be supported by a strong commitment to justice. Yet, in face of 
such best plans, we record in advance that both experiments miserably fail. They lead 
to social disasters, in terms of violence, self-destruction, and moral abasement. If the 
sleep of reason produces monsters, what about its wake? Two similar questions should 
be raised about love and law, too.
Of Law, Economy, Sex, and Violence
Dogville and Manderlay  provide two different illustrations of the Demiurgic dilemma. In 
Dogville, Grace acts from below, through her own attitude of unconditional love. She ar-
rives in town as a fugitive. She is in a precarious, liminal status. As a ‘critical being’ 
(Fitzpatrick and Tuitt eds. 2004) who finds herself in a structurally weak role, she enjoys 
no formal power or protection whatsoever. What she follows is rather Christ’s example 
of unconditional dedication to others asking for nothing in return. At each moment,  with 
her behaviour Grace rejects the logic of retaliation. In Manderlay, Grace acts from 
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above, through the type of unquestionable authority  that is provided by the ‘monopoly of 
legitimate violence’ (Weber 1978[1922]). She arrives at the Manderlay plantation as a 
nomothètē, lawgiver and ruler at the same time. The ancient law, Mam's law of slavery, 
is overthrown and replaced with a new law, purported to be enlightened, democratic, 
and capitalist.
Whereas in Dogville the focus is on close interpersonal relationships and how control 
and exploitation tend to emerge in small scale interaction, in Manderlay  the focus is on 
the explicit set of institutions and apparatuses that define the core of State power. Con-
sequently, while Dogville raises issues concerning in particular inclusion and exclusion, 
status ranking, and the ethology of human behaviour (such territoriality and the relation-
ship of insiders to foreigners), Manderlay draws attention the problématique of the rela-
tionship  between implicit and explicit law, policing, custom, and ‘instituent power’ (Cas-
toriadis 1987[1975]).
Foundations of social order is all about power. True, Foucault (1982) advised us to 
adopt a rigorously nominalistic view on power: power is not a substance, nor an es-
sence, but rather a point of view from which to describe what happens in the social. But 
such nominalistic caution does not in fact change the type of questions that we must 
face in the attempt to grasp the problem of foundations: how does power spread 
through and across social fields? How does it circulate among actors? What is the rela-
tionship  between the best known face of power, cohercion, and its others more subtle 
forms, such as influence, seduction, persuasion, interpellation, and positioning? Not to 
speak of moral problems that are inherent to power distribution, as well as power itself. 
Given that power can be productive but also destructive, there must be a pedagogy of 
power. But what type of education is this? Is Grace undergoing some sort of pedagogy 
of power? Is the story all about training onself to power?
Four main spheres of power can be observed as criss-crossing the social field in 
Dogville and Manderlay. These are politics, economy, sex and violence. 
The legal and political basis at both Dogville and Manderlay is a type of social  authority 
that is initially unquestioned. At Dogville in particular, the community defines itself 
through its own customs and mores, which it never ceases to praise. They may be poor 
and humble, but they have their way of living. In this context, Grace is an alien who 
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does not share the same old ways common people content themselves with. Despite 
her best efforts to avoid raising any political issue, Grace is the bearer of a revolutionary 
attitude. It is an attitude of unconditional love and rejection of the logic of retaliation: an 
apparently politically harmless but in practice deeply destabilising factor. At the Mander-
lay's plantation, on the other hand, it not simply a matter of traditional mores coming into 
conflict with a personal attitude. On stage is rather the conflict between the Old Law, 
Mam’s slave law, and the New Law, which Grace enforces in the name of democracy, 
but in fact in the shape of an enlightened dictatorship.
It may seem at first that economy is not a major issue in the two movies. But closer 
scrutiny reveals plenty of hints to the organisation of societal material reproduction and 
its consequences. More subtly, each system of production is presented as a constrain-
ing factor upon the narrated events. Both communities, as small ‘worlds apart’, are ap-
parently  isolated economic system, although obviously  there are signs of exchange with 
the world ‘out there’. In both cases, change in the economic sphere is dramatic: Dogville 
faces us with the consequences of the unexpected generation of surplus within a sur-
vival economy (a surplus which is Grace herself, as an economic resource en route to-
wards commodification). On the other hand, Manderlay  pivots around a supposed tran-
sition from forced labour to economic liberalism. Here, Grace’s action recalls rather 
neatly Marx’s description of the genesis of capitalism in modern Europe, with its libera-
tion of labour force from land bondage. From this point of view, economy is in fact seen 
as a ‘ultimately determining’ factor, in the sense that it determines the horizon of the 
events. But what counts most are people’s reactions to those constraints.
Sex is another crucial force at stake. A small caveat should be introduced here. Lars 
von Trier has been sometimes charged of mysogyny. Regardless various ambiguous or 
provocative declarations on the topic by  the director, that point is not quite important to 
our present analysis. To us, the director’s personal opinion is far less relevant than the 
characters’. We are also interested in weighting the objective impact of such a force as 
sex upon the whole story. In both plots, sex represents a destabilising factor. In Dogville, 
Grace becomes the slave whore of the whole male part of the village, and the slave 
servant of the rest. It is a story  that raises dramatically  the issue of the relationship  be-
tween between bondage and lust, as well as the contiguity between humans and ani-
mals. Lust is particularly appalling in Dogville, as it is observed from the victim’s point of 
view. It raises a strong sense of indignation in viewers. In Manderlay, on the other hand, 
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the temptation of excessive eros and transgression is presented from Grace’s point of 
view. Here, Grace’s sexual attraction for Timothy plays havoc especially  with her capac-
ity to lead the plantation.
Finally, violence is an element that interweaves with all the others factors presented so 
far in complex and sometimes unpredictable ways. In Dogville, from the initial, seem-
ingly  peaceful situation, people’s attitude towards Grace shifts scene after scene from 
tolerance and respect towards hatred and brutal exploitation. Dogvillians are pushed by 
their innermost istincts to do terrible things to Grace. The rape scene is the awful climax 
and the symbol of such deeds. Just like a silent tide does violence grows, until it is fa-
tally stopped by the gangsters, who radically snatch it from the Dogvillians and direct it 
with far more efficiency and viciousness against the Dogvillians themselves. The coup 
de théatre of the movie is the discovery that Grace is in fact a gangsters’ associate 
rather than a prey. In Manderlay, legitimate violence officially remains in the hands of 
Grace until the end. Backed by the gangsters, who embody the primitive police appara-
tus, Grace now plays the Leviathan, who boils down diffused violence into that bundle of 
concentrated violence that is the State. Whereas interpersonal violence is horizontal 
and one-on-one, the State introduces a new monotheist type of violence, which is verti-
cal and one-on-many. The State expropriate private violence by attempting, not to elimi-
nate it, but rather to monopolize it to its own advantage. This is precisely why when the 
community is bloodthirsty, it is the State – i.e., Grace – that must execute: at least in 
Grace’s own eyes, this is the necessary condition to have ‘justice’ rather than mere 
‘vengeance’.
But Grace falls into yet another, even more gigantic, contradiction. At the outset, she en-
ters the plantation by taking the whip  out of the slavemaster’s hand. She boldly declares 
that slavery is over: henceforth, everyone will enjoy human dignity  and none will be sub-
jected to cruel and unusual punishments. But at the end of the movie it is the same 
Grace in an attack of rage and impotency whom we see whipping the same slave who 
was being whipped at the beginning. When she had to face the fact that she had be-
come a public executioner, she had at least still the comfort that she was acting in the 
name of an albeit vague ideal of jutice. Now, she has even lost that comfort: she is be-
ing violent just because of an emotional burst of hate, or lust, just like anybody else.
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The outlook on violence is thus of a political-realist type. In parallel to Robert Michels’ 
(1966 [1912]) ‘iron law of oligarchy’, we encounter an ‘iron law of violence conservation’, 
which reads: you can only change the violence’s keeper, not its overall quantity. Grace 
reaches Dogville during her attempt to get rid of her former violent life, but all she finds 
in the peaceful village is a type of violence which is as least as abject as the one she 
was used to. At Manderley, she fights against the backwardness and cruelty  of slavery, 
but in the end she is forced back to clasp that same abominable violence. Following 
René Girard (1978), the source of the violence that spreads int he social field lies in de-
sire, insofar as desire is mimetic by  nature. A desire is not a relationship between a sub-
ject and an object, but a relationship between two subjects, mediated by an object. 
Desire, Institutent Power, and the Sacred
As Girard (1972) argues, the management of violence in society is often a matter of 
finding a direction in which to drive it, rather than a matter of increasing or decreasing its 
overall quantity. Whenever violence has filled the hearts to the brim and people are 
ready to cut each other’s throat, the only way to prevent it from wiping the whole com-
munity away is to find a scapegoat, which will be later turned into a ritualised sacrificial 
victim. Not only  does Grace, by her arrival in the apathetic and sluggish rural commu-
nity, fills the Dogvillians’ hearts with a desire they were unaware of before. She is also a 
total outsider to the community, doomed to remain foverer like that. As such, she em-
bodies the perfect scapegoat. Girard (2004) remarks that “[i]n isolated and ignorant 
communities, cultural differences are disturbing. A  visiting stranger may start a panic 
and be attacked simply because his speech and mannerisms differ slightly  from the lo-
cal standards”. Truth be told, here we are a dealing with a kind of vicious circle: for it is 
only Grace’s aesthetic appeal and the desire she inspires – along with the appeal of the 
impunity  in exercising violence against someone who is so thoroughly remissive – which 
prevents the Dogvillians from crushing her immediately. Thus, we are the aural zone of 
a sacrificial crisis. The outcome is an ambiguous and, arguably, temporary balance be-
tween exploitation and sacrifice. 
Dogville further confronts us with another Girardian insight: violence is contaminating. 
Its effects spread around and must be stocked carefully like nuclear wastes if one wants 
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to prevent violence going astray. The grim end of the movie shows what happens when 
calculations about the confinement of violence are not well done. In most cases, how-
ever, it is the election of a surrogate victim which generates unanimous accord among 
its prosecutors. This is not very different from what anthropologists called a potlach, a 
ritual destruction of one’s goods. But at Dogville the ritual is still to come, it is still to be 
instituted. Grace’s killing would be the instituting moment of a ritual, during which the 
victim could be turned into sacred. From this point of view, to have it with Girard again, 
violence and the sacred are inextricable from each other. Foundations is exactly  about 
such inextricable linkage of violence and sacredness. 
The origin of institutions is always enveloped in what Pascal called the ‘mystical  foun-
dations of authority’. Not simply  do we tend to forget that institutions are human crea-
tions. Such méconnaissance, such amnesy of the genesis, is a precise necessity for in-
stitutions to work. The instituting moment must be concealed because it would fatally 
expose its fundamental contingency, arbitrariness, and injustice. Besides, when ob-
served from the point of view of the instituted institution, instituent power (Castoriadis 
1987[1975]) is threatening because it is always radical. The crucial question thus con-
cerns the role of the nomothete in the ritual-institutional complex. If the surge of violence 
can be channeled into a type of sacrifical violence, who has the real power to do so? In 
other words, whose will becomes institution? Who can use collective violence to one’s 
own advantage without being torn apart? Ultimately, this amounts to ask: to which ex-
tent can one use violence rather than being used by it?
Morals of the lords, morals of the slaves
“A dog or wolf that offers its neck to its adversary in this way will never be seriously bitten. 
The other growls and grumbles, snaps with his teeth in the empty air and even carries out, 
without delivering so much as a bite, the movement of shaking something to death in the 
empty air. However, this strange inhibition from biting persists only as long as the defeated 
dog or wolf maintains his attitude of humility” (Lorenz, 1961: 188). 
In the passage quoted above, German ethologist Konrad Lorenz compares the behav-
iour of two species of animals: the wolf, the symbol of cruelty and greed, and the dove, 
which has been so often taken to symbolise the peaceful heart. But, in fact, Lorenz ob-
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serves, during a fight, the wolf does not finishes his adversary off when the adversary 
assumes submission postures. Quite the contrary, in similar situations the dove kills 
mercilessy, despite the defeated’s remisive signals. 
There is little doubt, if any, that the Dogvillians subscribe to the second behavioural pat-
tern when a humble, weak creature by name Grace ends up  in the range of their beaks 
and talons. The fact that they are all sided against the weakest is what makes their vio-
lence so unbearable and disgusting. Not simply is it violence, it is violence of a cheap 
and mean kind. But what is the driving mechanism to violence? And who is led to resort 
to such type of violence? At this point, one cannot fail to abserve that our ethological 
discussion of wolves and doves echoes rather closely Friedrich Nietzsche’s distinction 
between morals of the slaves and morals of the masters. For Nietzsche, slave morality 
is the product of ressentiment and unsatisfied desire of vengeance. Since their initial 
defeat, ther initial humiliation, slaves feed their hate towards masters, who are physi-
cally and morally  superior and independent, but cannot give vent to it. Not simply this. In 
essence, what really characterizes slaves is the fact they are absolutely uncapable of 
accepting their desires of vengeance as such. Rather, they  dress them us as imper-
sonal, universal justice: slaves are constantly taken in such self-justificatory exercise. 
Thus, the Nietzschean observers declares:
Now I’m hearing for the first time what they’ve been saying so often: ‘We good men — we 
are the righteous’  — what they demand they don’t call repayment but ‘the triumph of right-
eousness.’  What they hate is not their enemy. No! They hate ‘injustice,’ ‘godlessness.’ What 
they believe and hope is not a hope for revenge, the intoxication of sweet vengeance (some-
thing Homer has already called ‘sweeter than honey’), but the victory of God, the righteous 
God, over the godless. What remains for them to love on earth is not their brothers in hatred 
but their ‘brothers in love,’ as they say, all the good and righteous people on the earth” (Ni-
etzsche 1887: §I, 13)
In an attempt to put Nietzsche’s vitalist idea at the service of social sciences, Max We-
ber analogously distinguished an ethic of heart or of conviction (Gesinnungsethik) from 
an ethics of responsibility  (Verantwortungssethik). Ethics of conviction is a principled 
ethics, in which action is presented as the application of some universal criterion of jus-
tice. As such, ethics of conviction does not know hesitation and knows no shame at all. 
On the contrary, ethics of responsibility  is forward-looking and takes into account the 
concrete outcome of one’s action. Because and insofar as slaves present themselves 
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as ‘the righteous’, they are clearly followers of an ethics of conviction. By representing 
themselves as poor good fellows, as humble people who simply stick to the old ways, 
by conceiving themselves as fundamentally ‘righteous’, Dogvillians and Manderleites of 
all kinds can perpetrate the worst acts without recognising the consequences of what 
they do as really their own fault.
Another effective cinematographic illustration of the slave vs master morality is provided 
by Ted Kotcheff’s First Blood (1982). Apparently, there is little resemblance between 
Dogville and First Blood. Yet these two movies, so distant for many reasons, share sev-
eral meaningful resemblances. When the Vietnam veteran John Rambo arrives to the 
little town on the Appalachians with no other plan but getting some food and rest, he 
very  soon fatally bumps into the arrogant local Marshall Teasle. Teasle wants to get rid 
of Rambo as soon as possible. The marshall is in charge of a dull, boring town and he is 
paid to keep  it like that, as he himself declares. In Teasle’s eyes, the very presence of 
people like Rambo is a threat to social peace. Rambo would not pass unnoticed, and 
his figure is necessarily received as unsettling local laws and established order. When 
the first move to ship  Rambo out of town proves unsuccessful, Teasle does not hesitate 
to put him under arrest for ‘vagrancy and resistance against authority’. 
At this point, Rambo has not committed any crime and he could not be reasonably 
charged of anything. Yet he is an outlaw simply because he is an intruder in Teasle’s 
territory. He is dangerous by definition, and any claim to the contrary on his part is taken 
as a provocation. Just like Grace, Rambo can’t belong in town. The little we get to know 
about Teasle’s order makes us think of a customary, reactionary, and clientelistic type of 
power. In one way or the other, Rambo is a perfect scapegoat for the natives’ xenopho-
bia. Just like a homo sacer, who may be killed by  anybody but may not be sacrificed in 
an official cerimony, everything is permitted against Rambo. He is chased like an animal 
in a sort of savage group  hunting, in which everyone is eager to shoot him on sight as 
first. 
Just like in Dogville, common people are shown as the perfect instantiation of the mor-
als of the slaves. Whereas wolves recognise submission signals from their conspecifics, 
doves kill mercilessy. Common people are unanimous, especially in hate. All against 
one may not be elegant, but is usually taken to be effective, especially  in cathartic 
terms: “The unanimous mimetic contagion transforms the disastrous violence of all 
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against all into the healing violence of all against one. The community is reconciled at 
the cost of one victim only” (Girard 2004). However, since Rambo is Rambo, the hunters 
ultimately  turn into the hunted. Just like Grace, Rambo is a nemesis who ends up  mash-
ing large parts of town. If not all is burnt down, it is just because Rambo’s hand is with-
held by the intervention of his former commander in army, the only one who still retains 
some moral authority upon him. What happens in the small Appalachian town where the 
movie is set is just a sample of the more general condition affecting Vietnam’s veterans 
in their relationship with mainstream American society.
What appears clear is that both Dogville and First Blood have at the core of their plot 
the result of a social experimentation. Both movies stage a situation in which a man or 
woman endowed with strong personality and strong will, who lives on a strong moral 
drive, is introduced into a community based on customary  law. The outcome of the ex-
periment unmistakingly  runs as follows: people who found their behaviour on custom 
gather together and hunt the foreigner to kill him or her. It is as though they instinctively 
sense that the foreigner and the type of morality  he or her is the bearer of is utterly  in-
compatible with their own. By doing so, in the very act of gathering together all against 
one, they resort to mob rule. Slave morality, as embodied by people at Dogville and 
those in the Appalachian community, is shown in all its depressing, dismal charme. 
If that is what happens in those two communities, what should we say about the people 
at the Manderlay  plantation? At Manderlay, Grace’s best reformist efforts clash against, 
not so much open hostility or malevolence, but rather the lack of will to change. It is not 
a simple matter of compliance, as it may seem at first. Grace is sure that people must 
be taught how to enjoy  freedom, so she embarks on a pedagogy of freedom. But even-
tually we find out that Mam’s law, the old law of slavery – which Grace contemptuously 
defines as ‘the most abominable document ever written’ – is in fact written by the old 
slave Wilhelm. Moreover, Wilhelm claims to have written it literally  for ‘the good of eve-
ryone’. Master morality, embodied here by the strong wind of change that blows from 
the Grace’s iron will, is defeated by the community’s conservatist, passive attitude. If 
Dogville already revealed Grace’s thrust toward change through unconditional love, now 
her attempt is institutionalised, and, consequently, her failure more visible. Grace is not 
defeated by  a strength that could have been fought against on an equal ground, will 
against will, high ideals against high ideals. Such conflict would have had some epic fla-
vour which slaves’ action will never know and will never be entitled to have. 
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The strange relationship between slave and master morality, which cannot be reduced 
to either conflict or cooperation, leads us to a further problem. Given that we have two 
markedly  different sets of behaviour in place here, what is the more ‘natural’ one? The 
word ‘natural’ is of course quite tricky, unless, at a first stage, we adopt a strictly Durkhe-
imian conception, according to which ‘natural’ – as well as ‘pro-social’ and ‘normal’ – 
have no transcendental moral dimension, but only a statistical one. In other words, to 
ask who is normal equates to raise the political ethical-question about majority and mi-
norities. Trier suggests a pretty  straightforward answer: Grace is a white fly – or, per-
haps more appropriately, a black swan. She is the abnormal. Sad but true, slave moral-
ity is largely overrepresented throughout the world. 
To raise the question about majority and minorities is not simply to raise a quantitative, 
numerical issue, though. Rather, the majoritarian and the minoritarian have a qualitative 
aspect to them. In order to qualify as a majority, one must not simply be the largest 
number. Rather, one must be capable of setting the model and the parameters of nor-
mality. Normality is the power of setting the sample. Thus, normality  can be represented 
by shared morality (Durkheim’s ‘collective conscience’) or by some ‘external’ landmark, 
such as law. But, contrary to what Durkheim thought, official law is not always the best 
mirror of collective conscience. If Dogville confronts us with a situation where the whole 
community unites in exploitation and hate without any formal legal recognition of that 
reality, Manderlay  puts us in front of the fact living law is not simply official law, so that 
changing law does not per se change society.
Back to Grace: couldn’t we just conclude that her idealism and naïvété are completely 
bad put and even solipsistic? That she is nothing but a poor alienated, a deviant? That 
she deserves the treatment she gets? Her father recurrently reproaches her ‘arrogance’. 
Let us not forget that she is the only major source of change that comes across two es-
sentially homeostatic communities. It always takes some clever, bright and, again, 
strongwilled intelligence to bring about change. Not simply  that: for change to occur, 
people must – by the hook or by the crook – be brought to a stage where they are ca-
pable of leaving their own their easy preferences and their lower istincts behind. Here’s 
why to embrace master morality  is more difficult than to embrace slave morality: the 
former requires smartness.
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Tradition and innovation
Normal people tend to live normally. Normal people ask no questions about how and 
why the world is like it actually is. They just follow the stream, falling back again and 
again on trusted and well-worn mores. Neither resistance nor creation have to do with 
or can be expected froom this type of people. To put it in a even scarier way, unless 
constrained, normal people merrily follow whatever order, subscribe to whatever law fits 
with their routines. This same issue is implicit in the Weberian conception of ‘legitimate 
power’, too, in the sense that the test of legitimacy is always on the verge of justifying 
whatever instituted power is in force at the moment simply because of its existence. 
The mainstream view, which comprises almost all modern populist authors, such as – to 
mention two very different examples – Manzoni and Tolkien, rejects the idea that it takes 
a strong personality  to produce the good-at-heart person who can introduce change in 
the world. By doing so, the mainstream view holds that goodness belongs to the major-
ity of common people and cruelty belongs to those few who ‘walk this earth bereft of 
their heart and soul’. As classical anthropolgists observed, all human groups represent 
themselves as inherently  good – ‘We are the righteous’, echoes the Nietzschean ob-
server.
It is precisely  such attitude of self-confidence which hampers any possibility of real 
change. Normal people have not reached that degree of smartness that would enable 
them, at Manderley, to appreciate Grace’s humanist ideals and, at Dogville, to treat 
Grace as a human being to take care of rather than one to enslave. Thus, the beast 
within is always ready to strike: torment the weaker and avoid direct confrontation with 
the stronger. To keep  the greedy beast at bay entails not simply moral but also cognitive 
qualities. One needs first of all to understand the existence of the problem. It is only by 
gaining a degree of self-reflexivity that it becomes possible to become critical about the 
existent order. Normal people are ‘normal’ precisely because they have no such self-
reflexivity. This is why they stick to custom. Implicitly  or explicitly, custom is configured in 
such a way to produce outbreaks of violence against change – more specifically, a type 
of violence imbued with ressentiment and cruelty. Cruelty is the revealing mark of nor-
mal people, or, to put it the other way around, to be good at heart requires some clever-
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ness. This also means that custom is like a seed that needs a specific soil to bloom and 
flourish. Even when the good message succeeds in fostering this kind of soil, the inbuilt 
flaw of human nature always threatens every potential good outcome.
So, who is the winner of the game: the one who pushes things to the extreme or the one 
who changes the rules of the game itself? In Manderlay, the old law, Mam's slave law is 
never really overcome. Its presence lurks through the whole story. Albeit reluctantly, 
Grace herself has to constantly go back to the book of the old law to learn things she 
did not know about the plantation. The old law is the dirty  secret in every new order. De-
spite such persistent ghost, had people been good, or clever, one could have success-
fully fulfilled Grace’s plan. The point is that, had people been good, or clever, there 
would have been no need for a Grace whatsoever.
***
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